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ESSAY
WTO Dispute Settlement and Sustainable
Development:
Legitimacy Through Holistic Treaty
Interpretation
JEFFREY LAGOMARSINO *

1. INTRODUCTION
Globalization, technological development, and the growing
awareness of issue linkages pose dynamic challenges to the
relationships of international law’s distinct rule-systems. Within
the increasingly fragmented realm of international law, the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) holds a contentious position
because of the relative extent to which it has been successful in
advancing its mission of multilateral trade liberalization. Much
of this success is a result of the institution’s effective and binding
dispute settlement system. However, the WTO’s ability to
reconcile multilateral trade liberalization with other, sometimes
conflicting, public values, is a central concern to the institution’s
legitimacy and is, therefore, vital to further advancing free trade
and to realizing its many benefits. By those who feel the WTO
has an obligation or self-interest to address such issues as trade
and labor or trade and environment (hereafter ‘trade and’ issues),
generally one of two governance models is advocated —
constitutionalization or global subsidiarity. 1 As the European
* The author can be reached by e-mail at JL2647@columbia.edu.
1. See generally Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO
Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity? 16 GOVERNANCE 73
(2003), available at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/14680491.00205 (arguing forcefully for a global subsidiarity approach). But cf. ErnstUlrich Petersmann, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 19, 19-25 (2000) (arguing for
constitutionalization).
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Union has demonstrated, these models are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Regardless of the merits or flaws of the
constitutionalization of ‘trade and’ norms within the WTO treaty
system, this approach has proven elusive and its realization
remains unlikely in the short term. Thus, WTO adjudicators
have been left the ambiguous task of reviewing the extent to
which the policy-balancing of diverse values done at the domestic
level is consistent with the superior legal norms of the WTO
Agreement. 2 Public international law at times plays a role in this
adjudication, given that it may fill normative gaps in the WTO
treaty and provide a context for treaty interpretation.
While there are several phenomena permitting WTO
adjudicators to incorporate public international law, 3 the
customary rules of treaty interpretation found in Articles 31 and
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 4 are of
particular importance. These rules not only guide adjudicators in
treaty interpretation, but they permit adjudicators considerable
access to general principles and substantive norms beyond the
WTO treaty. The extent and nature of the incorporation of public
international law into WTO dispute settlement is highly
contentious. Some fear that the trend of considering non-WTO
rules of international law will lead to ‘mission creep’ and judicial
overreaching, thus constituting a threat to the multilateral trade
regime’s legitimacy. 5 Others argue that the use of such rules is
2. Howse & Nicolaidis, supra note 1, at 81; see also Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The
Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733, 757-60 (1999), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=803745.
3. See Jose Alvarez, The Factors Driving and Constraining the Incorporation
of International Law in WTO Adjudication, in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 611, 612-22 (Merit E. Janow et al. eds.,
2008) (describing the following four factors that both “drive and constrain” the
incorporation of general international law: (1) the principles of competence de la
competence and of effectiveness; (2) fears of non-liquet; (3) the self-perceived role
of international judges and the “common law” of international tribunals; and (4)
The Vienna rules of treaty interpretation).
4. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
5. See José E. Alvarez, The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 146,
146-58 (2002); see also CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY,
DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 38-45 (Am. Enter.
Inst. Press 2001); see also John O. McGinnis, The Appropriate Hierarchy of
Global Multilateralism and Customary International Law: The Example of the
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necessary for the WTO’s legitimacy in terms of ‘trade and’
issues. 6 This analysis proposes how a full embrace of the general
rule of treaty interpretation found in Article 31 may mitigate
certain threats to legitimacy by incorporating international law in
a manner that permits deference, rather than leading to ‘mission
creep.’
2. CHALLENGES TO LEGITIMACY AND REASONS
FOR HOLISTIC TREATY INTERPRETATION
Following the failed creation of the International Trade
Organization (“ITO”), the resulting General Agreement on Trade
and Tariff (“GATT”) treaty came to exist in great isolation from
the greater corpus of international law that was developing
simultaneously. 7 The transformation of the GATT regime into
the much more legalistic WTO regime in 1994, with the signing of
the Marrakesh Agreement, occurred within the framework of
international law.
Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (“DSU”) makes the critical recognition that the
customary rules of interpretation of public international law
apply to the provisions of the WTO Agreement. 8 The Appellate
Body has since recognized that Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties are customary rules of
interpretation. 9 Article 31(3)(c), which permits the contextual
use of “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between parties,” has potentially great implications as it
allows WTO adjudicators to reach well beyond WTO law to apply
WTO, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 229, 262-66 (2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=421661.
6. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO:
How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 535, 577-78 (2001); see also Martti
Koskenniemi, Address in Frankfurt, Germany: Global Governance and Public
International Law 23 (Feb. 9, 2004), in 37 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 241, 263 (2004),
available at http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/MFrankfurt.pdf.
7. See generally Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat’s
Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 615 (1970).
8. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter DSU].
9. Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 26, 1996).
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substantive international norms. Thus, the question facing the
WTO adjudicators is not whether international law is applicable
in WTO cases, but rather what the nature of the complex
relationship between WTO lex specialis and public international
law is.
The seemingly benign acknowledgement that WTO law is a
part of public international law has unavoidably profound
implications on the mandate of trade liberalization—implications
that negotiators of the Uruguay Round could not have fully
considered as they painstakingly bargained a momentous
mandate for specific trade reforms. The minds of the negotiators
were understandably shaped by the relatively discreet and selfcontained world of the GATT regime. Likewise, the future
developments of public international law itself were less clear at
the time. It is therefore with similar naivety that the founders
also included in the WTO preamble the bold yet vague language
promoting “general welfare,” “sustainable development,” and
“optimal use of the world’s resources.”
Multilateral trade
liberalization is thus acknowledged as a means to higher societal
aims, rather than an end itself. Accordingly, the WTO preamble
is often embraced by environmental and human rights advocates
as a grand opportunity for the incorporation of substantive norms
of other branches of international law.
In response, ardent free trade advocates often pose three
arguments against the application of environmental and human
rights norms within the WTO dispute settlement system: (i) the
relatively weak scope and enforcement mechanisms of other
international legal regimes—mainly environmental and human
rights—reflect a deliberate state desire for such, and the WTO
has no authority or institutional interest to change this; (ii) the
greater incorporation of international law threatens the regime’s
effectiveness on trade promotion; and (iii) it opens adjudicators to
charges of overreach, and creates a systemic risk of mission creep
contrary to the intentions of founders.
The first argument, essentially a realist interpretation, fails
to account for the perspectives of the many civil society actors
within states and transcending states, which represent different
interests and values than the leaders of member states and many
of the most powerful lobbying groups that heavily influence those
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leaders. Although still lacking the domestic agenda-setting
power of lobbying giants, national and transnational civil society
groups have proven themselves capable of creating a legitimacy
crisis for the WTO regime, as made evident at the 1999 Seattle
ministerial meeting. Civil society groups promoting ‘trade and’
issues, such as environment and human rights, are here to stay,
and in a digital age they will increasingly find new avenues to
exert pressure on states and international organizations to live
up to higher environmental and human rights norms—most of
which states have already acknowledged and even committed
themselves to through other treaties.
While it is easy to focus on the more ridiculous and
uninformed demands of these actors and dismiss them all
accordingly, this ignores the reality that there are significant
negative environmental and human rights externalities to trade
liberalization, and the calls to account for them will only increase.
It is equally important to note that the interests of NGOs of the
Global North are often pursued in conflict with the interests and
development needs of member states and NGOs of the Global
South. 10 While the northern NGOs are quite capable of having
their voices heard, they represent only segments of global civil
society. On the whole, actors from organized civil society will
play an increasingly vital role—if still not a democraticly
accountable one—in the formation and empowerment of the
public sphere as a deliberative medium between citizenry and
international institutions such as the WTO. 11 This phenomenon,
in effect, flattens the traditional hierarchy on which international
law was created, and thereby adds significant complexity to WTO
legitimacy beyond ‘state intention.’
From a member state perspective, it is the inherently
sensitive nature of environmental and human rights norms and
the resulting divergent approaches to them that make strong
10. This was the case in Shrimp-Turtle. See infra Part 3.1; see also Walden
Bello, The “Shrimp-Turtle Controversy” and the Rise of Green Unilateralism,
ON
TRADE
(Bangkok),
July
1997,
FOCUS
http://focusweb.org/publications/1997/The%20Shrimp-Turtle%20
Controversy%20and%20the%20Rise%20of%20Green%20Unilateralism.htm.
11. See Patrizia Nanz & Jens Steffek, Global Governance, Participation and
the Public Sphere, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 314, 320-24, 647-50 (2004). This role
is becoming increasingly institutionalized at the international level itself.
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multilateral regimes on these matters so difficult to achieve. This
deficiency of enforced international agreements means that
members are naturally more likely to rely on domestic policy to
pursue such goals; and this domestic policy is likely to be highly
variable in strength and scope, based on social values and
economic interests. WTO adjudication that ignores these realities
is likely to be viewed by members as illegitimate infringement on
state sovereignty.
The second argument flows from the idea that liberalizing
trade is always more economically beneficial than not
liberalizing, and therefore to forego any progress in trade
liberalization is to hinder the net benefits to society from trade.
This view is well articulated by Jagdish Bhagwati, who states
that:
For instance, they [critics] argue that free trade is not sufficient
for growth; we also need other supportive policies. By and large,
yes; and every serious scholar of trade has understood this from
as long ago as the 1960s when the trade policies of the developing
countries were being studied. But then again, it does not follow
that freeing trade is no better than not freeing it. 12

The policy implication of this argument is that the WTO
mission should remain as trade-focused as possible, and
interpretation of WTO law should be accordingly narrow. In this
sense, there cannot be too much of a good thing (i.e. an ever
growing and powerful legal regime promoting multilateral trade
liberalization). This reasoning is lacking for the fact that the
general welfare created by liberalizing trade through the WTO is,
at some point, offset by the negative externalities of a powerful
legal regime that has at times hindered the realization of
environmental and human rights norms—both of which are also
essential to the high societal aims noted in the WTO preamble.
Therefore, contradictory to both challenges above, WTO law
must evolve in a manner more cognizant of its own advanced
development relative to environmental and human rights law. It
is not difficult to understand how sustainable development and
12. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Reshaping the WTO, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan./Feb.
2005, available at http://time.dufe.edu.cn/wencong/bhagwati/ FEERFinal.pdf.
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general welfare could suffer from negative externalities that
would result from the lopsided and parochial growth of any of the
different international legal regimes—one must only imagine a
theoretical reversal in the development of international trade law
and international environmental law.
In this case, the
externalities of the environmental treaties and enforcement
mechanisms would in some ways inhibit the agenda of trade
liberalization. Naturally, many environmental advocates would
claim that environmental protection is unequivocally good, no
matter the extent to which it out paces trade liberalization.
Likewise, it would be expected that in such a circumstance free
trade advocates would feel slighted by the lack of consideration
afforded trade matters in the international environmental legal
regime, be it via limitations to national sovereignty on trade
matters or ignoring international trade norms. Given that trade
liberalization is a key means to achieving economic gains, general
welfare would be hurt by the unwillingness of environmentalists
to give ample consideration to important interests beyond their
particular cause. In this sense, there can be too much of a good
thing if pursued in an ardently parochial manner. 13
Third, ardent trade enthusiasts fear that giving meaning to
the WTO preamble through the greater incorporation of
international law will inevitably lead to mission creep, which is
detrimental to the institution’s legitimacy on trade. This alarm is
exaggerated. WTO adjudicators have proven themselves acutely
aware of these fears, as well as the restricting language in DSU
Article 3(2), which expressly states that the “recommendations
and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements.” 14 DSU Article 7
again confirms that WTO tribunals “are not courts of potentially
general jurisdiction.” 15

13. Human rights are the possible exception, but even policies advocating
human rights are commonly pursued in a manner far too parochial.
14. DSU, supra note 8, art. 3.2.
15. Gabrielle Marceau, A Call for Coherence in International Law, 33 J.
WORLD TRADE 87, 113 (1999); DSU, supra note 8, art. 7. Pursuant to Article 7,
the mandate of panels is to examine claims made under any of the “covered
agreements.” Id. This infers the mandate of adjudicators and does not include
non-WTO agreements.

7

04 LAGOMARSINOMACROFIXED

552

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

4/15/2011 6:59 PM

[Vol. 28

Concerns of judicial overreach were similarly voiced after the
panel in Japan-Film established the principle of non-violation
claims. 16 Since then, panels and the Appellate Body have
rejected most all non-violation claims. Moreover, the WTO has
already shown itself more prone to mission creep via the
incorporation of non-trade issues in the negotiation rounds at the
behest of powerful interest groups in developed countries. The
TRIPS Agreement is a prominent example, as the Uruguay
Round would likely have failed without the support of the United
States if it were not for this inclusion of intellectual property
rights. 17
Even accepting that over a decade after its conception the
WTO’s institutional legitimacy requires that greater adjudicative
consideration be given to preambular goals, the task remains to
define a modernized interpretation of the relationship between
the preamble and the rights and obligations of the WTO
Agreement. Guidance can be found in Article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention, which confirms that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.” Article 31(2) explicitly states “the purpose of
the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the
text, including its preamble and annexes. . .” To the detriment of
their own argument, many advocates of the higher goals outlined
in the WTO preamble fail to appreciate that the raison d’etre of
GATT, and subsequently the WTO, is trade and not sustainable
development, general welfare, or any other aims. Despite how
advanced the WTO is relative to other international regimes, it
has bureaucratic and legal limitations such that it can provide
little public utility if its adjudicators are charged with becoming
the guardians of environmental and human rights law. Rather,
the operational assumption of the WTO is that increasing the

16. See generally Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer
Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998).
17. See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter TRIPS].
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benefits from trade is the single, yet valuable, contribution to
sustainable development and general welfare that WTO offers.
The subtle point here is that it is not inconsistent with this
fact to say that WTO adjudication, which permits trade that is
contrary to the goals in the preamble, is misguided according to
Article 31. In this sense, the preamble does much more than “add
colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the
Agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement” as the Appellate
Body stated in Shrimp-Turtle. 18 Specifically, with regard to the
role of WTO adjudicators, the preamble does not demand the
advancement of environmental and human rights norms; it only
obstructs interpretation of WTO rights and obligations from
impairing achievement of the highest goals that all major
international regimes (environmental, human rights, and trade)
claim to promote, namely sustainable development and general
welfare. This is more than a semantic distinction; it is one that
significantly limits the judicial principles of competénce de la
competénce and of “effectiveness” with respect to claimants
evoking non-WTO law. Pauwelyn argues that as this limitation
on jurisdiction was upheld in EC-Poultry, adjudicators would
presumably have greater latitude with respect to competénce de
la competénce and of effectiveness in the event that non-WTO law
This nuanced
was evoked by a member in defense. 19
understanding of the Appellate Body’s jurisdiction protects
adjudicators from the perception of overreaching and mission
creep.
Moreover, the interpretive obstruction performed by the
preamble holds true even where clear international norms are
absent on ‘trade and’ matters, so long as there is significant
intellectual consensus upon which states base their decisions, or

18. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 153, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 8, 1998) [hereinafter
Shrimp-Turtle].
19. Appellate Body Report, European Communities –Measures Affecting the
Importation of Certain Poultry Products, ¶ 156, WT/DS69/AB/R (July 13, 1998)
(adopted July 23, 1998). For analysis, see Pauwelyn, supra note 6, at 568
(discussing how the Appellate Body rejected the claimants request to consider
the Oilseeds Agreement; stating that the Appellate Body is not a court of
general jurisdiction, but a dispute resolution body of limited jurisdiction).
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“common intentions” 20 amongst WTO members. Nowhere does
the WTO Agreement state that preambular goals are legitimate
only to the minimum extent provided by public international law.
Alvarez advises the “self proclaimed ‘progressives’” that
“customary international law developments are not limited to the
possible rise of the precautionary principle or the elucidation of
economic and social rights.” 21 He further warns that the
International Court of Justice’s judgment in Oil Platforms should
give progressives concern that similar use of the principle of
effectiveness by WTO adjudicators could mean applications of
customary rights to own property and new definitions of “fair and
equitable” and “non-discriminatory” with regard to foreign
investors and traders. 22 However, there seems no valid reasoning
by which self-proclaimed progressives who advocate multilateral
trade liberalization should not generally support these
applications of Article 31(3)(c) as long as they do not cannibalize
Article 31(2).
Given that all norms have some degree of negative
externalities, there is no avoiding that these externalities must be
weighed in the adjudication processes to determine what
application of the law is most consistent with the preamble. 23 It
is for this precise reason that allowing amicus curia briefs was,
although risky, a necessary step for the WTO dispute settlement
system. Far greater steps must be taken to institutionalize
scientific and other intellectual expertise in the WTO
adjudication process in order to help determine whether domestic
policies are justifiable protections or disguised trade restraints. 24

20. See Pauwelyn, supra note 6, at 575-76.
21. See Alvarez, supra note 3, at 629.
22. Id.
23. In Shrimp-Turtle, both critics and proponents of the AB ruling could
claim their interpretation is more consistent with sustainable development. In
this author’s opinion, careful analysis shows that the Appellate Body’s ruling
was correct in this regard. The Appellate Body would do its public image well to
give more detailed explanation of its rulings in light of the preamble.
24. For such recommendations, see Siobán D. Harlow, Science-Based Trade
Disputes: A New Challenge in Harmonizing the Evidentiary Systems of Law and
Science, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 443, 446-47 (2004).
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3. METHODOLOGY FOR A “GLOBAL
25
SUBSIDIARITY” APPROACH TO TREATY
INTERPRETATION
Merely justifying the incorporation of international law in
the adjudication of WTO disputes does not adequately describe
how it may address legitimacy critiques, nor does it give guidance
to adjudicators who bear the heavy responsibility of
jurisprudence.
The preceding discussion identified the
complexities that an increasingly powerful public sphere poses to
the WTO dispute settlement system, but does not imply that
adjudicators ought to tailor their rulings to please civil society.
Not only would this be impossible to achieve, but it would cause
irreparable damage to the institutional legitimacy as perceived by
member states. Rather, adjudicators, in recognition of their own
tenuous legitimacy, should provide greater deference to
democratically accountable national authorities, which may then
serve as a buffer for many of civil society’s demands. Article 31 is
then a critical judicial tool for WTO adjudicators as it permits
“horizontal subsidiarity” 26 by which they may defer to other
international norms beyond WTO law in the many instances
where the WTO treaty is ambiguous. This holistic approach to
treaty interpretation also permits vertical subsidiarity, as it
allows national authorities greater deference on many ‘trade and’
issues, particularly environment, health, and human rights.
Deference to the policy balancing of democratic member states
does not deny WTO adjudicators their superior competence on
substantive norms like nondiscrimination or procedural norms
such as transparency and due process. 27 This methodology of
jurisprudence not only fosters legitimacy in the short term, it also
helps to mitigate normative conflicts inherent in a fragmented
international legal system, which is critical to the long-term
success of the international trade regime. 28 A look at the history
25. See generally Howse & Nicolaidis, supra note 1.
26. Id. at 75.
27. Id. at 87.
28. See generally Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration
and Article 31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 279 (2005)
(giving a detailed discussion of systemic integration as implied in Article
31(1)(c)).
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of WTO case law shows that the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence
has evolved towards this less mechanical and more holistic
approach to treaty interpretation. 29
There are several judicial principles pertinent to the holistic
approach to treaty interpretation found in Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention. WTO case law reveals that adjudicators
have regularly resorted to the principle of judicial restraint—the
so-called ‘passive virtues’—based on the practice of U.S. judges.
Alvarez aptly describes the traditional understanding of judicial
restraint within the context of international law:
International adjudicators share other characteristics that are
likely to pull them away from the mainstream and back to
demarcated rulings of lex specialis. . . . Common canons of
construction to promote judicial restraint include the principle of
judicial economy that dictates issuing an opinion on the
narrowest possible ground or the principle of non ultra petita
that requires judges not to decide matters except those raised by
the parties. 30

In the context of the WTO dispute settlement system, this
notion of judicial restraint has led to interpretations of lex
specialis that have been at times so narrow and textual as to
infringe on state sovereignty beyond what members intended,
particularly in cases of ‘trade and’ issues. 31 Such parochial legal
reasoning may inhibit states from the legitimate pursuit of
policies that promote non-trade agendas, as well as their legal
responsibilities under other facets of international law. It is with
great risk to their legitimacy that democratically unaccountable
WTO adjudicators assume the task of restraining domestic policy
based on contentiously narrow interpretations of WTO law.
Nevertheless, in the tradition of domestic judges, WTO
29. Federico Ortino, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body
Report in US – Gambling: A Critique, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 117, 120 (2006)
(claiming that the Appellate Body diverged from its holistic trend in their ruling
on US-Gambling).
30. Alvarez, supra note 3, at 619.
31. Several important WTO Panel rulings have committed such fault,
including Shrimp-Turtle, EC-Asbestos, EC-Hormones, and EC-Biotech.
Fortunately, the Appellate Body reversed or modified several panel findings in
the first three of these cases.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/3

12

04 LAGOMARSINOMACROFIXED

2011]

WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

4/15/2011 6:59 PM

557

adjudicators have often chosen to err towards ‘dictionary
jurisprudence,’ albeit to a much lesser extent than GATT panels.
Vast differences between mature, coherent domestic legal
systems and the fragmented international legal system, coupled
with an increasing understanding of issue linkages, make the
application of traditionally passive virtues yield different and, at
times, dubious results at the level of international adjudication.
The residual effect of such narrow legal reasoning is to further
aggravate the fragmented international legal system, particularly
when it is done by the WTO, which has the most powerful
adjudicative body of any international legal regime.
All international adjudicators are to some extent norm
entrepreneurs far beyond their domestic counterparts. Treaties
are less complete and their political contexts are often much more
complex. The methodology herein suggests redefining judicial
restraint and the so-called ‘passive virtues’ at the international
level in a manner that is more appropriate given the
fragmentation of international law and the democratic deficit of
adjudicators.
WTO adjudicators ought to show a judicial
restraint that is more akin to the deference described above. This
recognizes that in the case of international law, ‘overreaching’
does not just occur to the extent that adjudicators go beyond their
mandate, but also to the extent that they mechanically interpret
treaty text in a parochial manner. By taking the recommended
approach, WTO adjudicators would be more ‘passive’ and less
likely to be viewed by civil society and member states as
overreaching.
The doctrine of margin of appreciation, most notably used in
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), is useful for the
above methodology. Margin of appreciation is the principle by
which an international tribunal may evaluate the application of
international norms by national governments. 32 The two basic,
yet intertwined, principles of the doctrine are judicial deference
and normative flexibility, which together allow for a degree of
discretion to be granted to national authorities as the primary
appliers and interpreters of norms.
Normative flexibility
32. See generally Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation
Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2006) (giving a detailed
discussion of the doctrine).
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specifically applies to international norms that lack universal
interpretation. These principles are implicitly recognized in WTO
Agreements, as well as numerous instances of WTO case law.
Consistent with margin of appreciation, Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement states:
In examining the matter referred to in paragraph 5:
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall
determine whether the authorities’ establishment of the facts
was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was
unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was
proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even
though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the
evaluation shall not be overturned;
(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the
Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation
of public international law. Where the panel finds that a
relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one
permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities’
measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon
one of those permissible interpretations. 33

This notion of standard of review applies only to
antidumping, and its inclusion came after great negotiation. 34
Ministers at the Marrakesh Conference decided that in three
years this notion of deference would be reassessed to determine if
it should be made more generally applicable. 35 Both the growing
fragmentation of international law and the need for WTO law to
balance diverse values require that Article 17.6 not only be made
33. Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods: Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 art. 17.6, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Anti-dumping Agreement].
34. See generally Steven Crowley & John Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures,
Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 231 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl
eds., 2003) (giving a detailed analysis of the standard of review).
35. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision on Review of Article 17.6
of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/40dadp2_e.htm [hereinafter Decision on Art. 17.6].
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generally applicable, but that it have a practical effect. While
Article 17.6 may currently be interpreted as an instance of WTO
law contracting out of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention, which repeatedly imply that treaty interpretation
must be based on a single meaning of the text, this semantic
conflict should be clarified via the Doha negotiations. Specific
guidance should be incorporated in Article 17.6 that permits
multiple interpretations in circumstances where there is a
conflict of trade and non-trade norms, as well as when the issue
relates to preambular goals.
A look at WTO case law shows that member states are
permitted leeway given their relative preferences on certain
matters. By way of one example, in EC-Asbestos, the Appellate
Body held that “it is undisputed that WTO members have the
rights to determine the level of protection of health that they
consider appropriate in a given situation.” 36 Similar declarations
were made in US-Tuna, 37 Shrimp-Turtle, and EC-Hormones. 38
In addition to permitting a greater margin of appreciation, the
methodology for legal reasoning proposed above specifically
requires “operationalizing.” 39 Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna
Convention, states that, “[t]here shall be taken into account,
together with the context . . . (c) any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”
Campbell McLachlan has suggested that Article 31(3)(c) implies a
principle of “systemic integration within the international legal
system” and that it serves as the international adjudicator’s
36. Appellate Body Report. European Communities – Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 168, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12,
2001) (adopted Apr. 5, 2001).
37. Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 3.73,
DS21/R - 39S/155 (not adopted, circulated on Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter USTuna].
38. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), ¶ 253(g), WT/DS26/AB, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
Here the Appellate Body rejected the panel’s interpretation of Articles 3.1, 3.2,
and 3.3, and thereby essentially allowed a margin of appreciation with regard to
Member States’ harmonization of international sanitary and phytosanitary
measures. See generally Jenny Martinez, Towards an International Judicial
System, 56 STAN. LAW REV. 429 (2003).
39. Philippe Sands, Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of
International Law, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85, 102 (1998).
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“master-key which permits access to all of the rooms” of
international law. 40 For WTO adjudicators, operationalizing
Article 31(3)(c) entails applying international law as needed to
permit states the margin of appreciation necessary on ‘trade and’
matters, particularly in order to give meaning to the broad
preambular goals.
3.1 Shrimp-Turtle
The landmark Shrimp-Turtle case brought the Appellate
Body’s ability to resolve trade externalities to center stage as it
dealt with the competing values of environmental protection and
trade liberalization. Specifically, the Appellate Body defined its
task as “the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of
equilibrium between the right of a member to invoke an exception
under Article XX and the rights of the other members under
varying substantive provisions . . . of the GATT 1994.” 41 The
“line of equilibrium,” according to the Appellate Body, must
safeguard that “neither of the competing rights will cancel out the
other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of
rights and obligations constructed by the members themselves in
that Agreement.” 42
In evaluating the United States’ ban on the importation of
shrimp caught without turtle excluder devices under Section 609
of the Endangered Species Act, the Appellate Body referred
extensively to international environmental law in order to
interpret the vague terms of Article XX, which offers an
exemption to GATT obligations. 43 Article XX states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures:
40.
41.
42.
43.

See McLachlan, supra note 28, at 280-81.
Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 18, ¶ 159.
Id.
Id. ¶ 125-45.
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...
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
...
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption. . . 44

The Appellate Body specifically sought clarification from
Article 56 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”), 45 Agenda 21 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, 46 and the Convention on the Conservation of
Migratory Species of Wild Animals 47 to determine that natural
resources constitute both living and non-living resources.
Further, the Appellate Body referred to Appendix 1 of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”) 48 to conclude that, because they
are listed as endangered, sea turtles are in fact “exhaustible.” 49
Thus, the Appellate Body first found Section 609 to be qualified
under Article XX(g), and subsequently turned to determine if it
also met the standards of the chapeau. 50 The Appellate Body
stated that the chapeau of Article XX was “but one expression of .
. . good faith,” which it recognized as a general principle of
international law. 51 Article 31(1)(c) was then explicitly evoked to
“interpret the language of the chapeau, seeking interpretive
guidance, as appropriate, from the general principles of
international law.” 52 The Appellate Body found, accordingly, that

44. Id. ¶ 113.
45. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 56, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
46. See generally Report of the U.N. Conference on Env’t and Dev., June 3-14,
1992, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.151/26 (1992).
47. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,
June 23, 1979, UNEP/CMS (entered into force Nov. 1, 1983), available at
http://www.cms.int/documents/convtxt/cms_convtxt.htm.
48. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (CITES), App. 1, opened for signature Dec. 31, 1974, 27 U.S.T. 1087
(entered into force July 1, 1975).
49. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 18, ¶ 25.
50. See id. ¶¶ 123, 134.
51. Id. ¶ 158.
52. Id.
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Section 609 violated the chapeau by failing to allow for
multilateral negotiations regarding the ban and instead was
unilateral in nature, amounting to unjustifiable and arbitrary
discrimination. 53
First, by recognizing that Section 609 qualified under the
language of Article XX(g) as a general principle of international
law, the Appellate Body rejected the complainant’s argument that
the “exhaustible natural resources” only included mineral and
other such non-living resources, a decision contrary to what was
agreed upon at the time of GATT negotiations. 54
This
demonstrated precisely the manner in which references to
international law can permit adjudicators to modernize the
meaning of WTO language in accordance with the preamble. This
aspect of the Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body Report was a critical
step toward a more sustainable international trade regime and
equally important for the legitimacy of the WTO in
environmental matters.
The Appellate Body’s interpretation of the chapeau of
Article XX also exemplified the janus-faced nature of Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention, which affirms that the primary means of
treaty interpretation is based on the “ordinary meaning” of the
terms in the treaty. 55 The Appellate Body determined that the
ordinary meaning of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination”
was that members must attempt serious multilateral negotiations
prior to taking unilateral actions. 56 In this manner, the policybalancing goal of the United States was assessed via the
incorporation of international law, but its implementation was
still subject to the higher norms of WTO lex specialis. One would
be remiss to underestimate the substantial impact of this opinion
on the field of public international law. The finding that the
United States was at fault because of its failure to negotiate
multilaterally before taking unilateral action boldly asserts a
notion of state responsibility to cooperate, which has implications
53. Id.
54. The Appellate Body pointed out that this 1947 definition of “exhaustible
natural resources” is debatable itself, as the migratory fish species had already
been considered such under two adopted GATT rulings. Id. ¶¶ 127-31.
55. See Alvarez, supra note 3, at 620-21.
56. See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 18, ¶¶ 171-72.
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far beyond WTO law. 57 Despite striking down Section 609, the
Appellate Body’s ruling was consistent with sustainable
development, which requires coordinated and mutually
supportive environmental and trade polices amongst states. 58
This concerted multilateral effort is particularly necessary to
prevent the harm that “green protectionism” could likely have on
developing countries. While developing countries often support
environmental aims of developed countries, they need assistance
in meeting these higher standards that unilateral protectionist
policies do not unusually contain. 59 Moreover, the Appellate
Body recognized that should multilateral negotiations fail—as
they undoubtedly will at times—member states have every right
to take unilateral action under Article XX.
The international trade of biofuels represents a foreseeable
environmental concern that will require unilateral trade
measures as a “stop gap” until a multilateral agreement is
achieved. 60 Howse argues that according to the Appellate Body’s
second ruling in Shrimp-Turtle, not even multilateral
negotiations are required before unilateral action, so long as the
member taking the action adequately accounts for the different
conditions in the different countries that will be affected by the
policy. 61

57. See Alvarez, supra note 3, at 632-33.
58. As the Appellate Body noted, this approach is explicitly supported in
Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. See
Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 18, ¶ 41
59. BELLO, supra note 10, at 174-75.
60. See generally Stephanie Switzer, International Trade Law and the
Environment: Designing a Legal Framework to Curtail the Import of
Unsustainably Produced Biofuel, 6 J. INT’L TRADE L. & POL’Y 30 (2007).
61. According to Howse:
The importance of negotiation to the operation of environmental trade measures
is not discussed or even referred to in the AB's second ruling. This is apparently
because the AB found, in its second ruling, that the U.S. was able to build into
unilateral operation of its scheme sufficient flexibility, by certifying countries
that had a program comparable in environmental effectiveness, even if it
worked differently than the domestic U.S. regulation.
Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New
Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
491, 509 (2002).
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3.2 EC-Biotech
The legal reasoning of the panel in the EC-Biotech dispute
is an example of an unnecessarily parochial approach taken by
WTO panels and has raised questions as to the legitimacy of the
dispute settlements system. The panel dealt specifically with
whether the EC’s regulatory approach to genetically modified
organisms (“GMOs”) based on the precautionary principle is
permitted under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”). 62 While Article
31(1)(c) permits access to all sources of international law
“applicable in the relations between the parties,” the panel in ECBiotech unfortunately reiterated the reasoning of the GATT panel
in US-Tuna, which declined to consider treaty law, except that
which was binding on all 149 members of the WTO, thereby
subsequently disallowing the vast majority of treaty law and
limiting the adjudicators to customary international law. 63
Conversely, Pauwelyn correctly suggests that in the context of
applying non-WTO law via Article 31(1)(c), the non-WTO law
must reflect the “common intentions” of all WTO members. This
does not infer that all WTO members must be bound by the nonWTO law, but rather that they are at least implicitly tolerant of
it. 64 The dynamic nature of international norms makes this
distinction of particular concern as it is critical that WTO
adjudicators remain, to some extent, open to normative
developments in other branches of international law. 65 According
to the suggestion of Pauwelyn, the panel for EC-Biotech should
have considered the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, on which
the EC based its precautionary stance to GMOs. 66 Currently,
sixty eight WTO members have ratified the Cartagena Protocol

62. Panel Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products, 1, WT/DS291,292,293/R (Sept. 29, 2006)
(adopted Nov. 21, 2006) [hereinafter EC-Biotech].
63. See id. at 10-11; cf. US-Tuna, supra note 37, ¶ 4.27.
64. For further discussion, see Pauwelyn, supra note 6, at 575–76.
65. Caroline Henckels, GMOS in the WTO: A Critique of the Panel’s Legal
Reasoning in EC — Biotech, 7 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 278, 286-88 (2006).
66. Id. at 301.
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and another thirty three have signed it. 67 This protocol deals
specifically with the international trade of GMOs and the risks
therein associated with biological diversity. The Cartagena
Protocol, which was created with the explicit intention to be
compatible with members’ obligations to other international
agreements, 68 certainly could have aided the panel in their
interpretation of the terms of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement to
determine the members’ rights and obligations. 69 Moreover, the
precautionary principle, while not explicitly stated in the SPS
Agreement, is entirely relevant and sure to resurface in WTO
disputes as opinio juris on the matter becomes increasingly clear.
The panel therefore missed an important opportunity, regardless
of the degree of its normative flexibility, to embrace the principle
in a manner that would give clarity to Article 5.7.
3.3 Conclusion
The WTO finds itself in an uneasy position where much is
expected of it as the dominant legal regime in a fragmented
international legal system that lacks a hierarchy of norms. It has
become a lightning rod for globalization’s critics; it is upheld as
having the potential to be a progressive transnational economic
constitution; and ardent free traders wish to protect and advance
trade in the narrowest manner. The first step to fostering greater
WTO legitimacy is to diminish the drama and the expectations
67. See Convention on Biological Diversity, Parties to the Protocol: Status of
Ratification
and
Entry
into
Force
(Aug.
18,
2010),
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties; see also Marc Busch & Robert Howse, A
(Genetically Modified) Food Fight: Canada’s WTO Challenge to Europe’s Ban on
GMProducts, C.D. HOWE INST. COMMENTARY Sept. 2003, at 186 n.12, available at
http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_186.pdf. Howse and Busch note that
the United States is the sole disputant not to have signed or ratified the
Cartagena Protocol, although it has signed the Convention on Biological
Diversity, to which the Protocol is a supplementary agreement. The United
States did actively participate in the drafting of the Cartagena Protocol and
conveyed that the precautionary principle was valid international law.
68. The Cartagena Protocol preamble reads: “Emphasizing that this Protocol
shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations of a
Party under any existing international agreements.” Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Preamble, opened for
signature May 15, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208 (entered into force Sept. 11, 2003).
69. Henckels, supra note 65, at 301.
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that have over the years become associated with this one
organization. Permitting greater deference to the judgment of
democratically elected national authorities is an important start
in this regard. A methodology has been shown whereby this can
be remedied via greater incorporation of international law into
WTO jurisprudence.
While this paper has dealt primarily with the application of
Article 31 in ‘trade and’ disputes relevant to the preamble, the
interaction of WTO lex specialis and international law is even
more complex, as it encompasses a wide range of procedural and
substantive norms. Additionally, this interaction affects a variety
of cases, from the landmark rulings involving ‘trade and’ matters
like Shrimp-Turtle to the most mundane cases such as ECChicken classification. 70 Regardless of the law that members will
negotiate into the WTO Agreement, it is clear that there are
various factors both encouraging and restricting the proliferation
of international norms considered in WTO dispute settlement. 71
Such organic growth is certainly not constrained to the WTO and
proves that the international legal system has taken on a life of
its own. Figuratively speaking, the normative ship that is
international law has set sail and it has inevitably gone beyond
what the member states originally intended.
Broad, yet common, goals such as sustainable development
and general welfare, which all branches of international law
purport to promote, require mutually supportive legal regimes. It
can even be argued that the very long-term realization of the
specific norms of each regime requires this same mutual support.
To the contrary, however, legal parochialism remains a
significant impediment. While there are many reasons for this
reality, international adjudicators have the ability and,
increasingly, the desire to abate some of this contention. Alvarez
refers to this as “the self-perceived role of international judges
and the developing ‘common law’ of international tribunals.” 72 In
a rapidly globalizing world, in which issues are increasingly
70. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs
Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R,
WT/DS286/AB/R (Sept. 12, 2005).
71. See Alvarez, supra note 3, at 612-22.
72. Id. at 618-20.
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transnational
and transsubstantive,
most
international
adjudicators appreciate, at least implicitly, the desirability of
systemic integration and the emergence of a functioning
international judicial system based on common procedural rules
and interpretation of norms. In the words of Jenny Martinez,
this would serve “many values, among them, predictability,
fairness, ease of commercial interactions, and stability through
satisfaction of mutual expectations.” 73
If this grand vision can be said to exist among international
adjudicators, even vaguely, then at least the normative ship has
direction. The impediments to the development of a coherent
international judicial system are immense and approaching this
end with zeal could likely do far greater harm than good. At a
minimum, adjudicators should adopt a policy of “do no harm” in
this regard.
Martinez refers to this as “system-protective
reasoning,” 74 whereby adjudicators “consider if there is a course
that furthers, rather than impedes, the development of an
ordered international system.” 75
From the once self-contained era of GATT, the WTO
Appellate Body has joined in a constructivist trend towards
holistic treaty interpretation within the realm of public
international law.
Given the exceedingly difficult task of
adjudicating international trade matters in accordance with
terms as extraordinarily dynamic as “sustainable development,”
the Appellate Body should be praised for the cautious steps it has
taken to evolve the WTO treaty via case-law. Nevertheless, WTO
jurisprudence remains unacceptably far adrift from its preamble.
WTO adjudicators must remain increasingly open to interpret
trade law relevant to the ever-changing backdrop of public
international law. In this sense, the ambiguities of the WTO
treaty are perhaps a virtue, allowing adjudicators the creative
license necessary in the context of their work.

73. For detailed analysis of the emerging international judicial system, see
Martinez, supra note 38, at 429.
74. Id. at 528.
75. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 567 (1987).
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